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STATE REGULATION OF 
CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS 
Neal Devins* 
How can nonpublic education be both responsible and free? Responsible 
to serve the public interest;free to experiment and disagree. Without reg-
ulation, some schools may victimize patrons and endanger the general 
welfare. With regulation, dissent is jeopardized Where should the bal-
ance be struck?1 
Christian day schools2 are the fastest growing segment of private 
education. 3 This growth has been accompanied by an unprecedented 
amount of litigation between fundamentalist educators and the state, 
and an unprecedented amount of negotiation and legislative propos-
als.4 The fundamentalists contend, as a matter of religious conviction, 
that the state's role in the regulation of fundamentalist schools is lim-
ited to ensuring that every school provides its students with a basic core 
curriculum and that the schools satisfy reasonable fire, health, and 
safety standards.5 Government officials, perceiving their role as en-
compassing much more, have often enacted a variety of laws and regu-
lations which govern, among other things, teacher qualifications, 
curriculum, and textbooks. 6 Government officials allege that the ex-
isting structure of laws and regulations is a necessary and unobtrusive 
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PUBLIC CoNTROLS FOR NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS 2 (D. Erikson ed. 1969). 
When used throughout this Article, the terms Christian day schools, Christian schools, and 
fundamentalist schools are used synonymously. 
See THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN SCHOOL EDUCATION 1 (P. Kiene! ed. 1977) [hereinafter 
cited as KIENEL]. Based on the best available data, between eight and ten thousand of these 
schools have been established since the mid-1960's, with a current enrollment of approxi-
mately one million students. Carper, The Christian Day School Movement, 1960-1982, 17 
EDuc. F. 135 (1983). 
This article shall be limited to legal controversies between the fundamentalist educators and 
the state. The entire controversy, however, is much broader. See Devins, Fundamentalist 
Schools vs. the Regulators, Wall St. J. Apr. 14, 1983, at 26, col. 3. 
See Ball, Religious Liberty: New Issues and Past Decisions in A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL 
REFORM, 327-49 (P. McGuigan & R. Rader eds. 1981). 
See id. 
See Brown, Minimum Standards are Needed, CHURCH & STATE, May, 1980, at 8. Underly-
ing this belief is the presumption that a substantial enough number of private sectarian 
schools will fail in their education mission to justify state-imposed burdens on pluralism, 
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heightened by the varying successes and failures of each group before 
state boards of education, 8 in the halls of the state legislature,9 and 
before the courts. 10 Since Christian educators and state officials can 
point to "victories for their side" in other states, both groups have 
strengthened their resolve to remain fixed in their position. Yet varying 
policy determinations on the part of state rulemakers and state 
lawmakers do not suggest that neither side is right or wrong or that no 
sensible policy alternative exists. Inconsistent judicial holdings cer-
tainly do not suggest that there is not an appropriate standard of review 
in this type of litigation. 
Freedom of choice lies at the heart of American democracy. 11 Yet 
some individuals contend that in the field of education, government 
regulations should promote a state-selected system of values. A de-
mocracy should encourage all of its citizens to develop and refine their 
personal interests so that they can effectively participate in the political 
process. A pluralistic society, like ours, certainly should not attempt to 
breed conformity through its educational system. 12 
religious liberty, and parental rights. The evidence, however, is to the contrary. See i'!fra 
note 17. 
8. In Colorado, for example, fundamentalists were successful in their lobbying efforts to pre-
vent the State Board of Education from adopting minimum standards for private schools. 
See Craby, Educators Expect Fight Over Minimum Private-School Standards, Denver Post, 
Aug. 11, 1981, and Carper, The Whisner Decision: A Case Study in State Regulation of Chris-
tian Day Schools, 24 J. CHURCH & STATE 281, 301 n.67. In Maine, however, fundamental-
ists were unable to convince state officials to modify some of the regulations which governed 
their schools. Conversation with Ralph Yarnell, Maine Association of Christian Schools. 
9. In Pennsylvania, the Keystone Christian Education Association was unable to push through 
a measure which would have deregulated many aspects of private religious schooling. Con-
versation with Henry S. Aschbrenner, Deputy Executive Director, Pennsylvania Catholic 
Conference. Fundamentalists were also unsuccessful to have legislation adopted in Maine 
and Nebraska. See O'Quinn, Christian Schools to Continue to Fight State, Central Maine 
Morning Sentinel, Aug. 10, 1981; Herman, Church School dispute quite now hut-, Lincoln 
(Neb.) Journal, June 30, 1982. Fundamentalists in North Carolina and Alabama, however, 
were successful in having legislation adopted which effectively deregulated private religious 
education. 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 505 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. I 15C, art. 39 
(Cum. Supp. 1981) (replacing N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 115, art. 32 (1978)); Act of Apr. 6, 1982, 
No. 218, 1982 Ala. Acts -(amending ALA. CODE§§ 16-28-1, -3, -7, -8, -15, -23; 16-40-1; 16-
1-1 1; 16-4-16). 
10. See i'!fra notes 72-83 and accompanying text. 
11. As James Madison stated in the FEDERALIST PAPERS, "ambition must counter ambition ... 
since justice is the aim of government." THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison). Similarly, 
Justice Jackson contended in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943), 
Ifthere is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. 
319 U.S. at 639. John Stuart Mill expressed similar views in his essay On Liberty: 
The worth of a State, in the long run is the worth of the individuals composing it; . . . 
A state which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its 
hands even for beneficial purposes-will find that with small men no great thing can 
really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed 
everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order 
that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish. 
(Crofts Classic ed.) 117-118. 
12. Reflective of this view, Robert Kamenshine writes, 
The use of public schools to instill political values poses a serious threat to the mar-
ketplace of ideas and the integrity of the democratic process. Children are particu-
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If we truly cherish religious liberty, we should embody this freedom 
in our laws and judicial standards. If Christian educators can demon-
strate that their students learn as much as their public school counter-
parts, the state should limit its regulatory role to core curriculum 
requirements and school safety. 13 If state laws and regulations infringe 
on a sincere religious belief, the courts should require that the state 
introduce "clear and convincing proof' that its regulatory scheme is the 
least intrusive means available to obtain some compelling state inter-
est. 14 The dual focus of this article is an analysis of the positions and 
policy arguments made by state regulators and Christian educators and 
on the need for the courts to adopt a standard of review requiring state 
regulators to prove by clear and convincing proof their compelling state 
interest in the regulation of fundamentalist schools. 
THE INTERESTS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATORS 
Christian schools come in all shapes and sizes. Some are one-room 
schoolhouses which make use of self-paced curriculum packets; others 
are structured in much the same manner as public schools. Some are 
either affiliated with or part of a church or are independent. Common 
to all schools, however, is a strict adherence to an established interpre-
tation of fundamentalist religious and social values. 15 
larly susceptible to political indoctrination. As a consequence, the implementation of 
a political establishment prohibition (against state-selected ideologies) in this setting 
is crucial. 
Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CoLo. L. 
REv. 1104, 1134. 
Also supportive of this view, Chester Finn has commented, 
The United States is a heterogeneous society in which people-individually, and in 
groups and communities-hold varied and sometimes quite divergent ideas about the 
desirable character and content of formal education. These differ among such dimen-
sions as curriculum, pedagogical style, discipline, morality, values, religious content, 
and academic standards. Public policy should foster educational pluralism and diver-
sity that are responsive to those differences within the society rather than seeking to 
impose a uniform or homogeneous definition of schooling. 
Finn, Public Support for Private Education II, AM. Eouc., June 1980, at 9. Professors 
Kamenshine and Finn thus emphasize the need to produce graduates capable of indepen-
dently and critically assessing American society. See Katz, The Present Moment in Educa-
tional Reform, 41 HARV. Eouc. REv. 342, 356 (1971). 
13. See Devms, supra note 4. 
14. See Devins, A Fundamentalist Right to Education?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 21, 1983; Boothby, Gov-
ernment Entanglement with Religion: What .Degree of Proof is Required, 7 PEPPERDlNE L. 
REv. 613 (1980). 
15. Peter Skerry, who conducted a study of Christian schools in North Carolina, noted: 
The day begins with prayer, and pledges to both the American and the blue-and-
white Christian flag. Each class begins with prayer, and meals with grace. . . 
[A]lthough Bible study is only one part of the curriculum, all subjects are taught from 
a Christian perspective ... One of the most distinctive features of these schools is the 
strict discipline code . . . Insubordination or undisciplined behavior of any sort is not 
tolerated . . . Each school also has a detailed dress code . . . [T]hese rules are merely 
the reflection of everyone's values, teachers and parents alike. Willingness to abide by 
them is the primary admission criteria . . . As a result the interaction between teach-
ers and students is not marked by fear and intimidation but by mutual respect and 
friendliness. 
Skerry, Christian Schools Versus the IRS, PuB. INTEREST, Fall, 1980, at 23-24. 
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The curriculum method utilized by Christian educators often varies 
considerably from school to school. The most popular curriculum form 
is the Advanced Christian Education Program (ACE). "The ACE 
method of instruction is a self-study program whereby students work at 
their own speed and progress through a series of learning packets on 
varying subjects, referred to as 'paces.' The ACE program is Bible-
oriented in that passages from scripture are contained within the teach-
ing materials .... [T]he ACE curriculum is currently being used in 
approximately 3,000 church schools throughout the United States. An 
additional 500 to 1,000 new schools are expected to utilize the curricu-
lum when their doors open in [the next school year]." 16 Regardless of 
the curriculum form used, students in Christian schools generally do at 
least as well on nationally recognized achievement tests as their public 
school counterpartsY 
Christian school teachers are hired on the basis of religious convic-
tion, not academic qualifications. 18 Christian school teachers also re-
ceive extremely modest pay. 19 Thus it should come as no surprise that 
Christian school teachers feel they are pursuing a religious mission. 20 
Proponents of the rights of Christian educators often argue that teacher 
certification laws are unfair because it might be extremely difficult to 
find an individual who satisfies both the school's religious criteria and 
state's academic standards.21 Yet, at present, approximately seventy 
percent of Christian school teachers have graduated from a four-year 
college.22 
Parents are actively involved in the running of Christian schools.23 
In Missouri, for example, sixty-three percent of the families provide 
volunteer service to the Christian school.24 This active parental role is 
often pointed to by Christian school advocates as evidence that these 
16. State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 886 (N.D. 1980). 
17. If anything, it appears that private sectarian schools are doing a better job with their students 
than the public schools. See Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the 
Suhcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 554-
56 (1979) (Testimony of Dr. Paul K.ienel, Executive Director of the Association of Christian 
Schools International); Murren} 1f'hal Things are Caesar's?, CHURCH & STATE, May 1980, at 
6; BARTON & J. WHITEHEAD, SCHOOLS ON FIRE 49 (1980). 
In State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976), ''the prosecutor in the 
trial of the 1Vhisner case objected to the introduction of the Stanford Achievement Test 
scores on the Tabernacle Christian students as 'irrelevant and immaterial.' Apparently, the 
state took the position that compliance with the minimum standards was indispensable to an 
adequate education." Rice, Conscientious Objection to Public Education: The Grievance and 
the Remedies, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 847, 886 (1978). 
18. See Skerry, supra note 15, at 25-26; and Ball supra note 5, at 336-338. 
19. See Skerry, supra note 15, at 25 and D. HAM, REASONS WHY PARENTS ENROLL THEIR CHIL-
DREN IN FUNDAMENTALIST CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, {Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri 
at Columbia, 1982). 
20. See supra note 18. 
21. See Ball, supra note 5, at 336. 
22. See D. HAM, supra note 19, at abstract. 
23. See Skerry, supra note 15, at 26. 
24. See D. HAM, supra note 19, at abstract. 
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schools will be self-regulating without unnecessary and intrusive state 
interference. Attorney William Ball, for example, has commented that 
[p]arents are not long going to invest money in schools which are 
worthless. Parents who care enough about their children to enroll 
them in private schools are, by and large, parents who are keenly inter-
ested in their children and willing to sacrifice for them.25 
The Christian school movement is a national phenomenon of fairly 
recent origin. Although some schools were formed more than fifty 
years ago, the average age of the schools is less than six years.26 De-
spite its recent growth, Christian schools still adhere to a well-defined 
educational philosophy. Consequently, state lawmakers and bureau-
crats have an established factual base on which to make legislative and 
rulemaking determinations. Lawmakers' actions, however, are not 
predictable. 
Perspectives of Christian Educators 
The growth of Christian schools can be explained by two interre-
lated phenomena. First, fundamentalists are dissatisfied with the aca-
demic and social environments of public schools.27 Second, 
fundamentalists believe that public schools have become "secularized" 
so that religious values no longer have a place in public education.28 
Fundamentalists are dissatisfied with the academic and social envi-
ronments of the public schools for several reasons. The most signifi-
cant reason is the perceived breakdown of the nuclear family. This is 
evidenced by the increased willingness of parents "to have the state 
take over formation of their children."29 Fundamentalists find this un-
acceptable for two reasons. First, the fundamentalists believe that par-
ents shape the future through the upbringing of their children. 30 
Second, fundamentalists allege that the state, if left to its own devices, 
will create a monolithic educational structure which stamps out "the 
needed diversity for a truly free society."31 
Fundamentalists are also fearful of the "moral breakdown" in our 
public schools associated with lack of discipline, sexual permissiveness, 
and drug and alcohol abuse. 32 This perceived breakdown is viewed as 
antithetical to the learning of both ethical and academic lessons. The 
moral corruption and intellectual decay among today's youth is attrib-
25. Ball, supra note 5, at 12. 
26. See D. HAM, supra note 19, at 37-38. 
27. See Devins, supra note 4; and Carper, supra note 3, at 281-282. 
28. See Devins, supra note 4; J. WHITEHEAD, THE NEw TYRANNY 18 (1982), Whitehead & Co-
lan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and its First Amendment Implica-
tion, lO TEXAS TECH L. REV. 1 (1978); and Rice, supra note 17. This notion-that public 
schools inculcate their students with secular values-was recently acknowledged in [Ala-
bama school Government of Christian Schools prayer case). 
29. W. BALL, LITIGATION IN EDUCATION: IN DEFENSE OF fREEDOM 14 (1977). 
30. See J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 28, at 20-22. 
31. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 28, at 3. See also Ball, supra note 5. 
32. See Carper supra note 3, at 281-282; and D. HAM, supra note 19. 
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uted to a number of factors, including television, lack of parental su-
pervision, and lower expectations of children in the public schools.33 
Interestingly, these criticisms of public schools bear a striking resem-
blance to a number of studies undertaken to explain the decline of col-
lege entrance examination scores. 34 
These criticisms reflect a basic philosophical difference between 
Christian educators and the public school establishment. "Like the 
seventeenth-century Puritans, [fundamentalists] believe in the 'innate 
depravity of man.' Because they believe that the corrupt nature of hu-
manity can be changed only through a supernatural infusion of Divine 
grace, religious 'conversion' becomes the basis of all education. Fur-
thermore, since human nature is utterly depraved, children require 
strict supervision and authoritarian guidance."35 In sharp contrast, 
fundamentalists see public education as operating under the premise 
that human nature is basically good,36 which results in less supervision 
than necessary to keep students on the course of righteousness and 
dignity. 
Finally, fundamentalists accuse the public school establishment of 
inculcating their students with a system of values known as "secular 
humanism."37 Humanism signifies "the idea that men and women can 
begin from themselves without reference to the Bible, and by reasoning 
outward, derive the standards to judge all matters."38 Fundamentalists 
object to the teaching of "secular humanism" for three reasons. First, 
they believe that God, as reflected in the Bible, is the proper source of 
all values. 39 Second, they claim that the humanistic value system is in a 
constant state of flux and thus is incapable of serving as the basis for 
consistent moral judgment.40 Third, they feel that public school stu-
dents are being denied access to important lessons whose source is the 
Bible .41 This denial is a result of several Supreme Court decisions 
which prohibited the teaching of creationism,42 organized prayer,43 Bi-
ble readings,44 and the posting of the Ten Commandments in the pub-
lic schools.45 Exacerbating this problem is the inclusion of courses in 
the public school curriculum, such as sex education and the evolution 
33. /d. 
34. See, e.g., On Furtlter Examination: Report of tlte Advisory Panel on tlte Scltolastic Aptitude 
Test .Decline, College Entrance Examination Board (1977). 
35. Nordin & Turner, More titan Segregation Academies: Tlte Growing Protestant Fundamentalist 
Scltools, 61 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 391, 392-93 (February, 1980). 
36. See id. at 393. 
37. See supra note 28. 
38. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 28 at 38. 
39. See generally id.; and KIENEL supra note 3. 
40. See J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 28 at 41-42, where American humanism is referred to as "a 
system of arbitrary absolutes, philosophical relativism that changes with opinion but that 
demands absolute submission to its arbitrary will of the moment." 
41. D. HAM, supra note 19, at 75. 
42. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
43. Engel v Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
44. Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
45. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
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of man, which the fundamentalists find morally objectionable.46 
All of these criticisms express disapproval of our society for foster-
ing this educational enterprise. As Professor James Carper noted, "[t]o 
many evangelicals the public school exemplifies the trend they deplore 
in the changing American social order, such as uncertainty concerning 
sources of authority, dissolution of standards, waning of the Judea-
Christian value system, loosening of custom and constraint, scientism, 
and government social engineering."47 Moreover, "[a] local fundamen-
talists church ... is both homogenous and highly stable. It is the only 
organization which its members control at a time they feel [that] gov-
ernment institutions are out of control. It is often the only structure 
they trust and certainly the one in which they feel most comfortable, 
since much of their social as well as their spiritual life revolves around 
it."48 
Many of the fundamentalists' criticisms of public education are 
based on their belief that the public school environment inculcates a set 
of values at odds with the types of moral lessons that they want to see 
their children learn. But the fundamentalists also seek to advance a 
particular set of religious values through their schools, rather than 
merely removing their children from a "hostile" public school environ-
ment. Christian schools, therefore, base their actions on two constitu-
tionally protected rights: the general right of parents to direct the 
upbringing of their children,49 and the religious liberty interest of par-
ents to direct the religious upbringing of their children. 5° 
Christian educators believe that private religious schools are man-
dated by God. 5 1 This belief on the part of the fundamentalists, that 
education is inherently religious, mandates noncompliance with state 
licensing procedures which grant broad authority to state boards of ed-
46. See D. HAM, supra note 19, at abstract. 
47. Carper, supra note 8, at 281-82. Reflective of these considerations, the reasons for founding a 
Christian school are, in order of importance: 1) a desire for students to receive moral and 
religious instruction; 2) a desire to have students taught by Christian teachers; 3) a belief that 
public schools are academically inferior; 4) opposition to specific courses taught in public 
schools; and 5) a belief that there are discipline problems in the public schools. See D. HAM, 
supra note 19, at abstract. It should be noted that these schools are not formed in order to 
avoid school desegregation orders. See D. HAM, supra note 19; Nordin & Turner, supra note 
35; and Skerry supra note 15 at 28-31. 
48. Skerry, supra note 15, at 23 (quoting from The Schools That Fear Buill). 
49. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
50. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
51. This mandate has been staled: 
First, the Bible teaches that children belong to the Lord (Ezekiell8:4, Psalms 50:12) 
and that the Lord has given children to parents as a heritage (Psalms 127:3). Parents, 
as God's stewards, are commanded to teach their children in their belief-"in the 
nature and admonition of the Lord" (Deuteronomy 6:6, Ephesians 6:4). Finally, all 
people instructed to obey God's commands (Proverbs 22:6). Thus, God while delegat-
ing specific responsibilities to civil government (Romans 13:1-7;I Timothy 2:14;I Pe-
ter 2:13-17), has clearly staked out education as religious and doctrinal in content and 
wholly within the province of the local church. 
SMITH, FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON STATE REGULATIONS OF RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 
[Independent Writing Project: 1-11-80). See also COOLEY, THE CHRISTIAN EDUCATION 
MANDATE (Berean Baptist Christian Academy). 
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ucation to promulgate "equivalent educational standards" for nonpub-
lic schools. 52 For the fundamentalists, this authority in effect makes the 
state lord over their schools. 
Fundamentalists also refuse, as a matter of religious conviction, to 
abide by far-reaching state regulations.53 This refusal is based on the 
belief that the state education bureaucracy is hostile to the central reli-
gious mission of Christian schools.54 In support of this contention, fun-
damentalist educators allege that the educational bureaucracy has been 
unduly influenced by anti-Christian thinkers.55 Fundamentalists be-
lieve that the more the state seeks to make its private religious schools 
more like public schools through regulations, the less likely it is for 
Christian schools to fulfill their religious mission. 
Another reason Christian educators refuse to follow many state reg-
ulations is because they view their schools as God's property.56 For 
them, to concede that the state has the ultimate authority to regulate 
their schools would breach the New Testament command to "render, 
therefore, to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things 
that are God's."57 Christian educators claim that the Christian school, 
as an inherently religious institution, is properly within God's province. 
Fundamentalists acknowledge, however, that some limited state regula-
tion is appropriate to ensure that students learn basic subject areas in a 
healthy environment.58 The fundamentalists are more concerned with 
52. See supra note 31; Devins, Fundamentalist School and the Law, The Christian Science Moni-
tor, Sept. 22, 1982, at 23; Smith, supra note 51, at 2-3; and Ball supra note 29. 
53. See Ball, supra note 29; Ball, supra note 5; and Devins, supra note 52. 
54. See J. WHITEHEAD supra note 28, at 9-14. 
55. For example, the influential educational philosopher John Dewey contended in A COMMON 
FAITH: "I cannot understand how any realization of the democratic ideal as a vital moral 
and spiritual ideal in human affairs is possible without surrender of the basic division to 
which supernatural Christianity is committed." [quoted from J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 28, 
at 14]. 
56. See Smith, supra note 51; and Devins, supra note 52. 
57. Matthew 22:21. 
58. See W. BALL, supra note 29; W. BALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CHRISTIAN 
ScHOOLS, (1981); and Ball, Law and the Educational Mission of Christianity, Theology, News 
and Notes, (Dec. 1980), at 9. It should be noted that some fundamentalists are strict separa-
tionalists and thus refuse to acknowledge that the state has some legitimate regulatory au-
thority. See The Police Lock a Baptist Church, Christianity Today, Nov. 12, 1982. These 
"separationalists" or "religious anarchists" refuse to raise the defense of excessive govern-
ment involvement in Christian School lawsuits, claiming that to argue that excessive entan-
glement is impermissible is to concede that some government intervention is permissible. 
See Minnery, JJoes JJavid Gibbs Practice Law as well as the Preachers Church-State Separa-
tion?, Christianity Today, April 10, 1981, at 48. This separationist tact has been criticized for 
both its failure to recognize that some government regulations are appropriate and its weak-
ness as a legal argument. /d William Bentley Ball offered the following criticism of the 
"separationists" in a recent speech: 
While we may speak of governmental inadvertence against religious liberty, we must 
also take note of the mentality which holds that government is an alien body in our 
midst. It is "they" inevitably pitted against ''us" ... [Yet] "the government," in the 
American System is ourselves, "We the people .• . (G)ovemment Agents frequently 
forget this, but let religious people not fail to remember it. 
Ball, Government as Big Brother to Religious Bodies, reprinted in, GovERNMENT INTERVEN-
TION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, at 23-24 (D. Kelly ed. 1982). 
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the possibility that the state extend its reach and end the parents' con-
trol of their child's moral, spiritual, and educational upbringing. 
Fundamentalist educators often challenge expansive state regula-
tions governing their schools in court.59 They usually argue that the 
enforcement of such laws and regulations would deprive them "of their 
liberty to freely carry out their religious mission in the form of Chris-
tian education and chill, if not destroy, the evangelical minist~ of the 
pastor in the religious mission of the schools in their charge."6 There 
is no reason to suspect that this claim is not sincere.61 
THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE 
Education is one of a state's most compelling responsibilities. The 
state's interest in education was noted by the great educational re-
former, Horace Mann, who said, "the true business of the schoolroom 
connects itself, and becomes identical, with the great interest of soci-
ety."62 Economist Milton Friedman claims that "a stable and demo-
cratic society is impossible without a minimum degree of literacy and 
knowledge on the part of most citizens and without widespread accept-
ance of some common set of values. Education can contribute to 
both.''63 Education enables an individual to function as a member of 
society and to contribute positively to their community. In other 
words, education is: (1) necessary to the individual in that it prepares 
him for community life and (2) necessary to our society since it is a 
participatory democracy. 
Supreme Court decisions on education have evidenced a judicial 
cognizance of the fundamental role that education plays in furthering 
59. See ir!fra notes 72-83 and accompanying text. 
60. Bangor Baptist Church v. State, 549 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Me. 1982). (State's motion for sum-
mary judgment in Christian School lawsuit denied). Another claim typically made by fun-
damentalists is that: 
[f]he public schools of today are overrun with an increase in crime, drug and alcohol 
addiction, teacher assaults, vandalism, and disrespect for authority and property. Ad-
ditionally, secular humanism is the basic philosophy of the public education system 
... [It is] further maintain[ed] that, because their philosophy is Christian and that of 
the State Department of Education is not, the latter is not capable of judging the 
philosophy of [Christian] school[s]. Finally, because the state school laws require in-
spection of the school by the county superintendent, [Christian schools] cannot submit 
to control because the State has no right to inspect God's property." 
State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 806, 301 N.W. 2d 571, 579 
(1981). 
61. No court in a state regulation of Christian school lawsuit has held that the school's failure to 
comport with state regulations was not religiously motivated. In State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 
883 (N.D. 1980), however, the North Dakota Supreme Court did hold that the religious 
school failed to demonstrate that a teacher certification regulation impacted on sincere reli-
gious belief. 294 N.W.2d at 894. Also, both the Fifth and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
have held that sincere religious belief was not at issue in lawsuits involving Christian school 
compliance with section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act. Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, 
Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) and Fiedler v. Marunsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144 
(4th Cir. 1980). See infra notes 109 to 120 and accompanying text for a discussion of these 
cases. 
62. Education in a Democracy, ANNALS OF AMERICA 365. 
63. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY 86 (1962). 
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the interests of the individual and of the nation. The particular impor-
tance of education to a democratic society and to its citizenry was given 
classic expression in Brown v. Board of Education :64 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of the state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
great expenditures for education demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society . . . in these days, it 
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life 
if he is denied the opportunity to an education.65 
Although it has acknowledged education's fundamental role in Ameri-
can society, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that 
education should be viewed as a fundamental interest.66 The states, 
therefore, have broad descretion in establishing rules and regulations 
which govern both public and private schools. Not surprisingly, there 
are great variations in the sorts of educational philosophies and con-
comitant regulations which govern America's private schools.67 
64. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
65. Id at 493. Similarly, Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence in McCollum v. Board of Edu-
cation, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), called the public schools 
the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic 
people ... The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most 
persuasive means for promoting our common density. 333 U.S. at 216. 
In Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), Justice Brennan's concurrence 
followed this line of thought when he noted: 
Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civil institution for the preserva-
tion of a democratic system of government. . . It is implicit in the history and charac-
ter of American public education that the public school serve a uniquely public 
function. 
374 U.S. at 230, 241-42. 
66. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See also Gold-
stein, Interdistricl Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and 
its Progency, 120 PA. L. REv. 504 (1972). But see Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational 
Opportunity A Workable Constitutional Test for Stale Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 
305 (1969) and Serrano v. Priest II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929, cert. 
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977). 
67. It is important to note the following: 
I. Diane Doerge Wilson reports that in a 1980 study Charles O'Malley, now head of the 
division of private education for the U.S. Department of Education, found that among the 
fifty states: (1) there is no consensus about the definition of a nonpublic school; (2) only five 
states have mandatory accreditation for nonpublic schools; (3) twenty-eight states have vol-
untary accreditation programs; (4) thirty-two states have voluntary or mandatory approval 
programs; and (5) six states have private school advisory committees. WILSON, PUBLIC PoL-
ICY AND NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 23 (1981); 
II. In 1979, the National Association of Independent Schools, in a survey of state in-
dependent school regulations found that: (1) twenty-two states have specific course require-
ments that apply to nonpublic schools; (2) eighteen states have requirements about the 
number of instructional hours students must receive that apply to nonpublic schools; 
(3) three states require that students take a state regents examination; (4) sixteen states re-
quire that nonpublic schools adhere to all state standards that apply to public schools; 
(5) thirty states require some type of reporting of student curriculum or teacher information 
from nonpublic schools; (6) six states require mandatory competency evaluations of non pub-
lic school students, and similar legislation is pending in seven more states; 
III. Patricia Lines noted in her 1982 report, Private Education Alternatives and State Rep-
lations, (Education Commission of the States): "Acceptable ways of meeting the schooling 
requirement vary widely among states. Some states require certification of teachers and 
schools, some only approval and some only minimal evidence that schooling takes place. 
Some states . . . give state and local officials wide discretionary authority to excuse a child 
1983] Christian Schools 361 
The authority of the state to promulgate regulations which govern 
private sectarian schools is subject to a reasonableness standard. In 
Runyon v. McCrary,68 the Supreme Court noted: 
[W]hile parents have a constitutional right to send their children to 
private schools and . . . to select private schools that offer specialized 
instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their children 
with private school education unfettered by reasonable government 
regulation. 69 
The Court also noted in Gillette v. United States 10 that "neutral prohib-
itory or regulatory laws having secular aims may impose certain 'inci-
dental burdens' on free exercise when the burden on First Amendment 
values is ... justifiable in the terms of the Government's valid aims."71 
Although the determination of whether a regulation is reasonable ulti-
mately rests with the judiciary, state legislators have wide discretion in 
formulating regulations to govern private schools. 
State legislators have enacted, to varying degrees, regulations which 
require private sectarian schools to satisfy minjmum standards in the 
following areas: (1) fire, health, and safety;72 (2) curriculum;73 (3) text-
book selection;74 (4) instructional time;75 (5) teacher certification;76 
from the compulsory attendance requirement. . . . Some states have consciously deregu-
lated their private schools. . . . [Some states have] consciously limited the extent to which 
the state board can regulate private schools. . . . Laws in about half the state permit in-
struction at home by a parent." Id at 3-5; 
IV. James Carper reported: "Bills which would to some degree free religious schools 
from state control have been introduced during the 1981 and 1982 legislative sessions in 
Vermont, Alabama, Nebraska, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. In Illinois, 
the House of Representatives sustained Governor James Thompson's veto of a bill which 
would have exempted religious schools from state licensing. . . In Iowa, a suit filed against a 
church-affiliated school was settled out of court in January 1982." Carper, supra note 8, at 
301 n.67. See generally KINDER, THE REGULATION AND ACCREDITATION OF NoN-PuBLIC 
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES, (Ph.D. dissertation, University at Missouri at Columbia, 
1982). 
68. 427 u.s. 160 (1978). 
69. Id at 178. See also authorities cited in Note, The State and Sectarian Education: Regulation 
to Deregulation, 1980 DuKE L.J. 801, 811-812 note 59. 
70. 401 u.s. 437 (1971). 
71. Id at 462. 
72. This sort of regulation was unsuccessfully challenged by fundamentalists in North Dakota. 
State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (1980). Fundamentalists, however, do not generally chal-
lenge this sort of regulation. See supra note 58. 
73. Fundamentalists prevailed in their challenge to this type of regulation in Ohio and Ken-
tucky. State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E. 2d 750 (1976); Kentucky State Board v. 
Rudasill, 589 S.W. 2d 877 (Ky. 1979). The state prevailed in North Dakota, North Carolina, 
and Nebraska. State v. Shaver, 294 N.W. 2d 883 (N.D. 1980); State v. Columbus Christian 
Academy No. 78 (Wake County, N.C., Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1978), vacated as moot and dis-
missed (N.C. May 4, 1979); State ex rei. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 
N.W. 2d 571 (1981). Cases are now pending in Maine, Michigan, Iowa, Nebraska, and Mas-
sachusetts. Bangor Baptist Church v. State, 549 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Me. 1982) (summary 
judgment granted); Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. State (Ingham County, Mich., Cir. Ct., 
Dec. 29, 1982) (appeal pending); Pruessner v. Benton and State Board of Public Education 
(Floyd County, Iowa, Dist. Ct. No. 23190); State v. Bible Baptist Church (Lincoln, County, 
Neb., Dist. Ct. No. 359); Attorney General v. Grace Bible Church & Christian School (Suf-
folk, Mass., Super. Ct., Civ. No. 54209) (also known as Bailey II). 
74. Fundamentalists successfully challenged textbook selection provisions in North Carolina 
(Columbus Christian Academy, supra note 73) and Kentucky (Rudasill, supra note 73). 
75. Fundamentalists have generally been unsuccessful in their challenges to instructional time 
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(6) zoning;77 (7) consumer protection;78 (8) student reporting;79 (9) test-
ing;80 (10) state licensing;81 (II) community interaction;82 and (12) gui-
dance services. 83 The most controversial of these regulations are 
programmatic ones which govern actual teaching practices in nonpub-
lic schools, including curriculum, textbook, and teacher certification. 
statutes and regulations. "Kentucky and North Carolina legislation prohibiting private 
schools from operating on a term shorter than that of public schools and North Carolina 
regulations setting minimum hours for the school day and for daily teacher presence, were 
all upheld by the respective state courts without serious question." Note, supra note 69, at 
821. The Nebraska Supreme Court also upheld an instructional time provision. Faith Bap-
tist, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571. An Ohio instructional time provision, however, was 
held unconstitutional. Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750. 
76. Teacher certification laws were found unconstitutional in Ohio, Kentucky, and Michigan. 
Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750; Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877; State v. Nobel, No. 
S-7-91-9114-A, slip op. (Mich. Dist. Ct., Dec. 12, 1979). Teacher certification laws were up-
held in North Carolina, North Dakota, and Nebraska. Columbus Christian Academy, (Wake 
County, N.C., Super. Ct.); Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883;Faith Baptist, 207 Neb. 802,301 N.W.2d 
571. Cases are now pending in Maine, Michigan, Iowa, and Nebraska. Bangor Baptist, Sher-
idan Road, Pruessner, and Bible Baptist, supra note 73. 
77. Zoning might represent the largest subject of litigation between fundamentalists and the state 
(conversation with Charles Craze, Fundamentalist Attorney). One case where fundamental-
ists prevailed was the New Hampshire case, City of Concord v. New Testament Baptist 
Church, 118 N.H. 56, 382 A.2d 377 (1978). One case where fundamentalists were defeated 
was in Oregon. Damascus Community Church v. Clackamus County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 610 
P.2d 273 (1980). 
78. Although not involving a fundamentalist school, a Puerto Rican consumer protection statute 
was hefd unconstitutional as it applied to religious schools. Surinach v. Pesquera de Bus-
quets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979). 
79. Fundamentalists generally do not challenge student reporting requirements. Where they 
have, they have lost. See, e.g., the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision, Attorney General 
v. Bailey, I, 386 Mass. 367 (1982). 
80. "Christian schools have generally been willing to submit their 'product' voluntarily to rea-
sonable evaluation by the State through achievement testing." Note, Stale Regulation of Pri-
vate Religious Schools in North Carolina-A Model AjJproach, 16 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 405, 
416 (1980). Christian school leaders, however, have expressed concern that the state may 
impose otherwise impermissible curriculum requirements through extensive testing. See W. 
BALL, supra note 29, at 337-338. It should also be noted that many Christian school leaders 
and some courts contend that the state can satisfy its interest in education by requiring that 
Christian school students take and perform satisfactorily a nationally recognized achieve-
ment test. See Murreen,supra note l1,Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d at 884. See also Devins, supra 
note 14. This position, however, has been rebuked by some commentators and courts. See 
Note supra note 69, at 817 and Faith Baptist, 207 Neb. at 815-16, 301 N.W.2d at 579-80. 
81. Fundamentalists generally challenge broad state licensing laws which permit state education 
bureaucracies to promulgate regulations governing equality of education. In reference to 
this legislation, William Ball has commented: 
[Much of it) has been sloppily drafted . . . much of the regulatory matters . . . [are] 
incredibly poor stuff, embracing leaking definitions, internal contradictions, resolute 
departures from statutory authority, vagueness, all manner of unenforceable preca-
tory language, and, withal, greedy, unconstitutional overreaching in every direction. 
W. BALL, supra note 29, at 10-11. Despite these criticisms, courts have upheld this general 
authority in Hawaii, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Nebraska. State v. Fellowship of 
Christian Pilgrims,- Hawaii-, 651 P.2d 473 (1982); Columbus Christian Academy (Wake 
County, N.C., Super. Ct.); Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883; Faith Baptist, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 
571. Fundamentalists have prevailed, however, on this issue in Ohio, Kentucky, and Ver-
mont. Whisner, 41 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750; Rudast11, 589 S.W.2d 877; State v. 
LaBarge, 134 Vt. 276, 357 A.2d 121 (1976). But see State ex rei. Nagle v. Olin, 64 Ohio St.2d 
341, 415 N.E.2d 279 (1980). Cases are now pending in Maine, Michigan, and Nebraska. 
Bangor Baptist, Sheridan Road, Bible Baptist, supra note 73. 
82. Fundamentalists successfully challenged community interaction provisions in Ohio. 
Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750; Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877. 
83. This sort of provision was found unconstitutional in Kentucky Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877. 
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States with programmatic regulations contend that such regulations are 
necessary to assure that "students in nonpublic schools attain a certain 
minimum standard of education necessary for the welfare of the child 
and society."84 
Considering the great diversity in approaches to implementing 
these regulations and the fact that there is no known correlation be-
tween any programmatic state regulation and educational achievement, 
it seems that the threshold decision "to regulate" and the subsequent 
decisions of "what to regulate" is, for the most part, a matter of abstract 
(albeit sincere) policy preferences among state lawmakers. State 
lawmakers justify their decision to regulate private schools under one 
of two competing rationales, namely the "other guy" approach and the 
"cookie cutter" approach.85 The "other guy" approach holds that if 
there are no regulations, parents will abuse the system and cause the 
"miseducation" of their children.86 Under this rationale, regulations 
are appropriate in those instances where a state cannot afford to trust 
parents to direct the upbringing of their children. 87 The "cookie cut-
ters" approach holds that socialization is as significant a part of school-
ing as the learning of academic lessons. Thus, under the "cookie 
cutter" approach, the state ought to make private schools as much like 
public schools as the constitution permits. In other words, cultural plu-
ralism, for the "cookie cutter" is a negative. 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED INTERESTS 
The Right of Parental Control 
In the 1920's, the Supreme Court decided three cases which recog-
nized that the state was limited in the types of regulations it could im-
pose on private schools. The first case, Meyer v. Nebraska, 88 involved a 
state regulation which required that English be the language of instruc-
tion in all schools in the state through the eighth grade. Under this 
84. S. WALTHER, STATE REGULATION OF NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS 27 (1982) (Ph.D. Dissertation). 
85. These labels are borrowed from Robert Baker's essay, Statute Law and Judicial Interpretation 
in THE TWELVE YEAR SENTENCE (Rickenbecker ed. 1974). Mr. Baker used these two labels 
to explain alternative rationales for compulsory education. 
86. This rationale does not extend to fears-on the part of the state-that parents will be tricked 
into sending their children to fraudulent private schools. Curiously, this notion that the state 
ought to be paternalistic in its treatment of parents as consumers for their children's educa-
tion has never been advanced by the state. William Ball sought to discredit this type of 
parent paternalism as a possible rationale for state controls over nonpublic education Ball 
claimed: 
I believe that the parents, the children and the public are well protected by the "par-
ent market" factor. There are plenty of laws to protect parents and children against 
fraudulent or dangerous schools. These laws can be, and are, enforced in all fifty 
states, and there is no good reason for imposing an overlay of additional structures of 
law in view of that fact. 
W. BALL, supra note 58, at 12. 
87. Different people, obviously, will draw this line in different places. For example, a B.F. Skin-
ner type would permit for fairly intrusive regulations under an "other guy" rationale. On the 
other hand, a John Stuart Mill type would allow only the slightest amount of regulation. 
88. 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
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regulation, a private school teacher had been held criminally culpable 
for teaching German to an elementary school student. The Court 
found the regulation unconstitutional because, "[a teacher's] right to 
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their chil-
dren ... are within the liberty of the [fourteenth] amendment."89 
Expanding on Meyer, the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters ,90 ex-
plicitly recognized the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their 
children. In Pierce, the Court held unconstitutional an Oregon statute 
which required all children to attend public schools. The Court ruled 
that the State could not outlaw priva~e schooling and that 
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty up'on which all government in this 
Union repose, excludes any general power over the state to standardize 
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers 
only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture 
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, 
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.91 
In the last of the 1920's decisions, Farrington v. Tokushiage,92 the 
Court held unconstitutional a statute which sought to promote the 
"Americanism" of pupils attending foreign language schools in the ter-
ritory of Hawaii. This legislation "empowered the territorial govern-
ment to prescribe the schools' courses of study, entrance and 
attendance qualifications, and textbooks; to require their teachers to 
satisfy certain standards; to limit hours of operation and the pupils who 
may attend them; to freely inspect material, facilities and teaching; and 
to collect fees, issue permits and require reporting to insure compli-
ance."93 The Court held that these regulations violated the parents' 
due process rights and their right to control their children's education.94 
The significance of the right of parental control to future challenges 
of state regulation is questionable. First, the regulations involved in 
the Pierce, Meyer, and Farrington cases were unusual. The regulation 
89. ld at 400. 
90. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
91. ld at 535. The Court, however, recognized that: 
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all 
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require 
that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good 
moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good 
citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to 
the public welfare. 
ld at 534. 
92. 273 u.s. 284 (1927). 
93. S. WALTHER, supra note 84, at 39. 
94. The Court stated: 
They give affirmative direction concerning the intimate and essential details of such 
schools, their control to public officers, and deny both owners and patrons reasonable 
choice and discretion in respect of teachers, curriculum, and textbooks. Enforcement 
of the Act probably would destroy most, if not all, of them; and, certainly it would 
deprive parents of fair opportunity to procure for their children instruction which 
they think important and we cannot say is harmful. The Japanese parent has the right 
to direct the education of his own child. 
273 U.S. at 298. 
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in Meyer was not related to a legitimate state interest, and the statutes 
in Pierce and Farrington would have completely eliminated the private 
school options. Most state regulations which apply to private religious 
schools are related to a legitimate state interest and are not as obtrusive 
as in the 1920's cases.95 Second, the judiciary in the 1920's was ex-
tremely protective of individual rights which seemed threatened by any 
form of governmental action.96 Presently, the Supreme Court explicitly 
recognizes the constitutionality of reasonable state regulations of pri-
vate schools which promote a compelling state interest in education. In 
Board of Education v. Allen ,97 for example, Court observed that 
[s]ince Pierce, a substantial body of case law has confirmed the power 
of the States to insist that attendance at private schools, if it is to satisfy 
state compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which provide 
minimum hours of instruction, ·employ teachers of specified training, 
and cover prescribed subjects of instruction.98 
In other words, "if the State must satisfy its interest in secular educa-
tion through the instrument of private schools, it has a proper interest 
in the manner in which those schools perform their secular educational 
function."99 Numerous other Supreme Court decisions have recog-
nized the rights of states to impose reasonable regulations on its private 
schools. 100 But the Supreme Court has yet to determine where the line 
separating reasonable from unreasonable state regulations should be 
drawn.101 
The Religion Clauses 
Fundamentalist Christian educators claim that a constitutionally 
unjustifiable stranglehold is being placed on their religious liberty by 
state laws and bureaucracies. Countering the fundamentalists' posi-
tion, the state alleges that the existing structure of state laws is the least 
intrusive means available to satisfy the state's compelling interest in the 
education of its young. The resolution of these conflicting views of 
state authority is primarily based on the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment clauses of the First Amendment. 102 The Free Exercise clause pro-
95. See, e.g., supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text. 
96. LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 32 (Goldstein & Gee ed. 1980). 
97. 392 u.s. 236 (1968). 
98. ld at 245-247. 
99. ld at 247. 
100. See references listed in Note, supra note 69, at 811-812 n.59. 
101. See Devins, supra note 14. 
102. In addition to these First Amendment claims, fundamentalist educators often challenge state 
laws and regulations on void-for-vagueness and due process grounds. See, e.g. , Bangor Bap-
tist, 549 F. Supp. 1208; and Whisner, 41 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750. The fundamental-
ists successfully challenged Ohio's regulatory scheme on both of these grounds in Whisner. 
On the void-for-vagueness claim, the fundamentalists' success can be attributed to the 
inability of Ohio's Director of Elementary and Secondary Education to clearly articulate the 
meaning of the regulations. This is borne out in the Director's cross-examination by defense 
council: 
Q. The minimum standard on page 22 states: 'educational facilities, pupil-teacher 
ratio, instructional materials, and services at the elementary level are comparable 
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hibits the government from unnecessarily interfering in religiously 
based practices. The Establishment Clause, in part, bars the state from 
fostering an excessive government entanglement with religion. 
The Free Exercise Clause. The test normally applied in determining 
to those of the upper levels'. Now is that a standard which governs elementary 
schools? What does that provision means to you, Mr. Brown? 
A. It means that the elementary and secondary should be a comparable school sys-
tem, that the secondary should not assume and take away all the money and 
infringe upon the elementary. There should be an equality of the money, staff, 
and so forth. 
Q. Now, Mr. Brown, take as an example the administrator of Tabernacle Christian 
School. He reads this statement and he is saying, 'What does the state want of 
me?' What does it require of us?' And he reads, my educational facilities, our 
pupil-teacher ratio, our instructional materials and our services at this elemen-
tary level must be comparable to those of the upper levels. What do the words, 
'upper levels,' means? Does it mean high school? 
A. Comparing between elementary and secondary. 
Q. 'Upper levels' refers to secondary-what part of a secondary level is referred to? 
What grade of high school is referred to? 
A. Normally . . . ninth through twelfth. 
Q. Normally ninth through twelfth. Are you telling me the elementary school must 
then be comparable to grades nine through twelve, all four grades of high school, 
in ratio, services, facilities, and materials? 
A. The comparability there would be as far as one school handling elementary and 
secondary. There would be equitable expenditures between the two. 
Q. The regulation speaks of educational facilities. What is an educational facility, 
Mr. Brown? 
A. It is a school building. 
Q. It is a school building. It is not an expenditure, it is a school building, and my 
elementary school building must then be comparable to high school building. Is 
that what you told us this means? 
A. If you have a high school. 
Q. What if you don't have one? 
A. Then you can't compare it. 
Q. Mr. Brown, do you understand what this provision means? 
A. Yes. 
W. BALL, supra note 29, at 11-12. 
On the due process claim, the Whisner court held that the state violated the right of 
parents to direct the upbringing of their children. This general right is based in the due 
process clause. See discussion of Meyer, Pierce, and Farrington supra notes 88 to 96 and 
accompanying text. The Whisner Court held: 
The "minimum standards" under attack herein effectively repose power in the state 
Department of Education to control the essential elements of non public education in 
the state . .. [Consequently,] the right of appellants to direct the upbringing and 
education of their children in a manner which they deem advisable, indeed essential, 
and which we cannot say is harmful, has been denied by application of the state's 
"minimum standards" as to them. 
351 N.E.2d at 770. 
Other courts have not ruled for the fundamentalists on these grounds noting that "The 
Ohio minimum standards were self-contradictory and extreme in their effort to achieve 
equivalency in public and private education." Shaver, 294 N.W.2d at 898. See also Faith 
Baptist, 207 Neb. at 814-15, 301 N.W.2d at 578-79. 
It should be noted that the First Amendment claim (the right of parents to direct the 
religious upbringing of their children) is a stronger claim than the due process a stronger 
claim. See Runyon v. McCrary 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) and Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 
205, 215-16 (1972). Also, a statute found unconstitutional on void-for vagueness could be 
recrafted so as to be clear but just as intrusive. 
Finally, fundamentalist separationists do not raise the establishment clause defense (al-
though they will make due process and void-for vagueness claims). See supra note 58. See 
also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-34 (1972). 
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whether regulation of religiously motivated conduct violates the free 
exercise clause requires a three-part determination: 
(1) whether the challenge is motivated by, and rooted in, a legiti-
mately and sincerely held religious belief; 
(2) whether and to what extent state regulations burden free exercise 
rights; and 
(3) whether any such burden is justified by a sufficiently compelling 
state interest.103 
Government regulation which significantly burdens the free exercise of 
religion cannot withstand constitutional challenge unless it represents 
"the least restrictive means to achieve some compelling state inter-
est."104 But the exemption of a religious activity from regulation is not 
constitutionally required where it would "unduly interfere with fulfill-
ment of the (compelling) government interest."105 
The starting point in any free exercise clause analysis is a recogni-
tion that although laws cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and 
opinions, they may interfere with practices. In Reynolds v. United 
States, 106 the Supreme Court explained, in upholding the conviction of 
a Mormon under a federal anti-polygamy statute, that "[l]aws are made 
for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with 
mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices."107 In 
103. Bangor Baptist, 549 F. Supp. at 1217. The free exercise standard was articulated in a signifi-
cantly different manner by the U.S. Supreme Court in Thomas v. Review Board: "The state 
may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of 
achieving some compelling state interest." 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). Under Thomas, once a 
showing has been made that religious practice is burdened by a governmental program, the 
state must demonstrate both that its regulation furthers some compelling interest and that the 
regulation is the least restrictive means available for furthering that interest. Apparently, the 
Thomas test does not address questions such as: to what extent does the government pro-
gram infringe on religious practice or is the religious liberty interest so strong as to overbal-
ance a compelling state interest. The Yoder test does raise these questions. 
Because of these differences, it is hard to say whether a definitive standard of review 
exists in free exercise clause litigation. In applying the Yoder test, one court recently noted: 
The constitutional analysis of cases arising under the free exercise clause is generally 
tailored to the particular factual situation at hand. This approach is different from 
. . . cases arising under the establishment of the religious clause . . . where a well-
enunciated and broadly applicable test has been established. 
State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d at 890-91. 
Others, however, have criticized the free exercise standard as being too rigid in applica-
tion. Paul Marcus, for example, contended that: 
The major inadequacy of the current balancing test . . . is its failure to encompass a 
necessary third step (an ad hoc balance of the importance of the state's interest against 
the importance of the individual's interest) in its review. The Court takes its first step 
in determining whether they have been infringed by the state. It then takes the second 
step in deciding whether or not the state has a compelling interest for its action, an 
interest which could not be promoted by any less restrictive action. If the state inter-
est is compelling, the Court stops and the state automatically wins, even if the individ-
ual's interest is exceptionally compelling. 
Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under tlte Free Exercise Clause, 1973 
DUKE L.J. 1217, 1245. See also Weeks & Devins, .first Amendment Free Exercise Protections, 
LEX COLLEGII, Summer 1980, at 1. 
104. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718. 
105. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
106. 98 u.s. 145 (1878). 
107. The Court contended that its decision was based in the principles of organized government: 
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other words 
the Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and free-
dom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second 
cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of 
society. The freedom to act must have a£propriate definition to pre-
serve the enforcement of that protection. 
Thus while some degree of government regulation over religious 
activities is permissible, striking a balance between legitimate govern-
mental regulation and impermissible government dominion is a task 
that the judiciary confronts. Free Exercise Clause analysis is triggered 
when some state action infringes upon an individual's right to freely 
practice his religion. The threshold issue in free exercise litigation, 
therefore, is a determination of "the magnitude of the statute's impact 
upon the exercise of religious belief."109 
In Brown v. Dade Christian Schools Inc., 110 a plurality of the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Dade Christian's contention that its 
segregationist admissions policy was grounded in religious doctrine. 
For that Court, 
[although] a belief [need not] be permanently recorded in written form 
to be religious in nature . . . the absence of references to school segre-
gation in written literature stating the church's beliefs . . . is strong 
evidence that school segregation is not the exercise of religion. 111 
Additionally, some courts have held that, to be cognizable for First 
Amendment purposes, a belief must be central to the religion. 112 In 
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 113 for example, the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied the "centrality of belief' concept 
to deny the Cherokee Indian Nation injunctive relief to prevent the 
flooding of land sacred to the Cherokee Nation. 
Granting as we do that the individual plaintiffs sincerely adhere to a 
Can a man excuse his (illegal) practices ... because of his religious belief? To permit 
this would be to make the professed doctrine of religious belief superior to the law of 
the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Govern-
ment could exist only in name under such circumstances. 
Id at 166-167. 
108. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940). 
109. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th 
Cir. 1980). But see the discussion of the Thomas standard, supra note 103, which suggests 
that the threshold question is whether the government action negatively impacts on religious 
belief. 
110. 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977). The Christian school involved in Brown claimed that it was not 
bound by the Supreme Court decision which held that minority students could not be denied 
admission to private schools solely because of their race. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 
(1976). The basis of this decision was the right to contract protection of§ 1981 of the Civil 
Rights Act. The Runyon Court, however, explicitly left open the question of whether there 
was a valid free exercise defense to this§ 1981 right. 
Ill. 556 F.2d at 312. See also Fiedler v. Marunsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1980) 
where the court held that a church school could not raise a free exercise clause defense since 
it did not demonstrate that its pastor's arguably religious belief in racial separation was the 
church's belief. 
112. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 859-65 (1978). 
113. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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religion which . . draws the spiritual strength from feelings of kin-
ship with nature, they have fallen short of demonstrating that worship 
at the particular geographic location in question is inseparable from 
their way of life, the cornerstone of their religious observance, or plays 
the central role in their religious ceremonies or practices. 114 
Under this restrictive Dade Christian-Sequoyah view, free exercise 
analysis will be triggered if the belief (1) is clearly expressed either in 
the literature or traditions of religion and (2) is central to their religion. 
Most courts do not follow the Dade Christian-Sequoyah view, and for 
good reason. 
As Judge Goldberg pointed out in a special concurrence filed in 
Dade Christian: 
One person's heresy can be another's religion. It is extremely impor-
tant that religion be defined in such a manner that labeling does not 
become the touchstone of constitutional analysis. Religions can have 
abhorrent principles; most religious practices are benign, benevolent, 
and beneficient. But we should not judge a religion by its practices. 
One era's spiritual error is another's heralded religion.115 
Supreme Court precedents support the Goldberg view. 116 In United 
114. 620 F.2d at 1164. See also Frank v. Alaska, 604 82d 1068 (1979); People v. Woody, 394 82d 
813 (1964); and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
115. Brown, 556 F.2d at 317 (Goldberg, J., special concurrence). 
116. Laurence Tribe, for example, contends that "For the free exercise clause ... all that is 'ar-
guably religious' should be considered religious in a free exercise analysis." L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 828 (1978). This contention is supported by a number of 
Supreme Coun decisions. In United States v. Ballard, the Court held that "the truth or 
verity of religious doctrines or beliefs" could not be considered by a judge or jury without 
violating the free exercise clause. 322 U.S. 7-8, 96 (1944). Similarly, in Fowler v. Rhode 
Island, the Court held that "it is not the business of courts to say what is a religious practice 
or activity for one group is not religious under the protection of the First Amendment." 345 
u.s. 67, 69-70 (1953). 
The fact that anything "arguably religious" ought to trigger free exercise clause analysis 
does not displace the "centrality of belier• standard from free exercise clause analysis. 
Under the Yoder test, "centrality" is clearly a significant factor in the determination of 
whether the government imposed infringement on religion is justifiable. At the same time, a 
belief which is not the sine qua non of a particular faith still ought to be protected by the free 
exercise clause. See L. TRIBE at 862. Additionally, the argument that courts should assign 
the same value to all beliefs seems well-founded. As J. Morris Clark noted: 
When the objector is a member of a traditional religion, it may in some cases be 
possible to determine the strength of his belief by the relationship it bears to the theol-
ogy as a whole. Some sins are venial, others mortal. But the difficulty of pronouncing 
judicially upon matters of theological complexity must be emphasized: as one recent 
Note has aptly observed, "Where an act is ritualistic and the government contests its 
centrality to the particular religion the courts must act as the final arbiter in questions 
of religious doctrine-questions more appropriately decided by prelates than judges." 
Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327, 343 (1969). 
Finally, the "centrality" concept lends itself to arbitrary application. The North Dakota 
Supreme Court, in State v. Shaver, for example, held that a perusal of the record fails to 
disclose a deeply-rooted religious conviction against the u~e of certified teachers in the Bible 
Baptist School." 294 N.W.2d at 894. The basis of this conclusion was the fact that the school 
would permit certified fundamentalist teachers to teach at the school. This reasoning is mis-
guided for it assumes that there will be a sufficient number of certified fundamentalist teach-
ers ready, willing, and able to teach at the school. See supra note 28. Deference to the 
sincerity and veracity of religious belief, however, does not preclude some judicial inquiry to 
guard against fraudulent religious clause claims. According to Professor Tribe, "full protec-
tion of the values underlying the first amendment suggests that any test of sincerity as a 
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States v. Seeger, 117 for example, the Court defined "sincere religious 
belief' in very broad terms. Construing a statutory requirement that 
military consciencious objector status should be based in belief "in a 
relation to a Supreme Being," the Court characterized the question as 
whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place 
in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in 
God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption where such beliefs 
have parallel positions on the lives of their respective holders we can-
not say that one is "in relation to a Supreme Being" and the other is 
not.ms 
Thus some commentators have noted that individual morality can be 
characterized as a sincere religious belief. 119 This standard makes 
sense. 120 There is no reason to suspect that an allegation of belief is 
insincere, unless some "clear and convincing" proof suggesting other-
wise is adduced at trial. 
The line distinguishing permissible from impermissible government 
conduct which infringes on religious freedom is not clearly drawn. 121 
This confusion results from a standard of review in free exercise litiga-
tion structured so as to grant the fact finder great discretion in deter-
mining both the nature of the infringement on religious liberty and 
whether the state is using the least restrictive means available to it to 
further some compelling government interest. 122 Under this standard 
the government clearly cannot justify a particular regulatory scheme by 
the mere assertion that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter in 
question. According to Professor Laurence Tribe: 
prerequisite of exemption must be strictly limited to inquiries of this relatively neutral sort 
(publications or public claims of religious claimants), so that agents of government cannot 
readily bend the test to their religious prejudices." L. TRIBE, at 862. It should also be noted 
that an extensive government investigation into the "centrality of belief' in a religious liberty 
claim might independently violate the entanglement prong of the establishment clause test. 
See infra notes 132 to 139. Finally, the risk of fraudulent claims is one that we must take 
because "no one would limit the first amendment to the official orthodoxy of the relatively 
few religions that have elaborate dogmas." Note, Toward A Conslilulional IJifinilion of Reli· 
gion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1080 (1978). 
117. 380 u.s. 163 (1965). 
118. Id at 166. 
119. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-343 (1970) (purely ethical and moral consider· 
ations held to be religious), and J. WHITEHEAD supra note 28, at 108. 
120. Religion is clearly a personal matter and thus it is proper for the courts to recognize it as 
such. This "individualization" of religion was recently recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In Thomas, the Court upheld Thomas' First 
Amendment claims to receive employment compensation because he could not in good con· 
science assist in the manufacture of Army tanks. In Thomas, the Court based its free exercise 
analysis on the premise that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or 
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." Id at 714. Conse-
quently, the Court did not find controlling the facts that Thomas was struggling with his 
beliefs; that he was not able to articulate his beliefs precisely; or that other members of the 
same religious order could work in the munitions plant. Instead, the Court claimed that: 
Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation. The narrow function of a review-
ing court . . . is to determine whether . . . petitioners terminated his word because of 
an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion. 
450 U.S. at 716. 
121. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 720-27 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
122. See Devins, supra note 14. 
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In applying the least intrusive alternative-compelling interest require-
ment, it is crucial to avoid the error of equating the state's interest in 
denying an exemption with the state's usually much greater interest in 
maintaining the underlying rule of program for unexceptional cases. 
Only the first interest-that in denying an exemption-is constitution-
ally relevant when an exemption is sought.123 
Professor Marcus summarizes the results of earlier free exercise 
cases as follows: 
The free exercise ''losers,. have been Mormons who have served life 
sentences for practicing polygamy, and independently lost the right to 
vote; conscientious objectors who could not attend state-run universi-
ties, and could not, for a period, become naturalized citizens of the 
United States; Jehovah's Witnesses who, for a time, would be required 
to pay fiat license fees to sell their religious text, and still presumably 
can be prohibited from having their children sell or distribute religious 
literature in public; and Black Muslims, who have had an uphill battle 
in asserting their right to practice their religion while in prison.124 
Despite Supreme Court decisions permitting restrictions on religious 
liberty in a number of areas, the Supreme Court has been more respon-
sive to religious liberty claims for the past twenty years. 125 
The turning point in Supreme Court free exercise analysis was the 
1963 Sherbert v. Verner 126 decision. Sherbert upheld a Sabatarian's 
right to refuse Saturday work and still receive unemployment benefits. 
In Sherbert, the Court promulgated the compelling interest-least re-
strictive means standard.127 The Court also established the fundamen-
tal rule that 
[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon con-
duct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit 
because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting sub-
stantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate 
his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may 
be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substan-
tial. . . . Government may [not] . . . penalize or discriminate against 
individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to 
the authorities . . . nor employ the taxing powei to inhibit the dissemi-
nation of particular religious views. 128 
This rule, although framed in terms of economic benefits or penalties, 
is equally applicable to government regulation. In the case of govern-
ment regulations contrary to religious beliefs, an individual or institu-
tion will be pressured to forego its conflicting religious belief or else 
risk such government sanctions as jail sentence or the forceable closure 
123. L. TRIBE, supra note 112, at 855. 
124. Marcus, supra note 103, at 1219. 
125. See Note, General Laws, Neutral Principles, and the Free Exercise Clause, 33 V AND. L. REv. 
149 (1980). 
126. 347 u.s. 398 (1963). 
127. ld at 407-09. 
128. ld at 402. 
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of the nonconforming operation. 129 
The ultimate issue in distinguishing permissible from impermissible 
government action is the degree of proof required in applying the Sher-
bert test. 130 If the government need only demonstrate that its regula-
tion is arguably the least restrictive means available to achieve some 
compelling government interest, the state will have considerable discre-
tion in promulgating regulations which impact on religious freedom. If 
the government must introduce "clear and convincing" evidence that 
its regulatory scheme satisfied the least restrictive means-compelling in-
terest standard, however, the state will be forced to act very cautiously 
when it promulgates regulations which impact on religious liberty 
interest. 
The Establishment Clause. The establishment clause requires that 
government action, "first, must reflect a clearly secular legislative pur-
pose . . . second, [it] must have a primary effect that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion . . . and, third, must avoid excessive governmental 
entanglement with religion."131 In Bangor Baptist Church v. State, 132 
the court discussed the importance of the excessive entanglement con-
cept in establishment clause litigation: 
An unconstitutional entanglement generally involves 'the govern-
ment's continuing monitoring or potential for regulating the religious 
activity under scrutiny.' 
. . . 'In determining whether there is entanglement, the question is 
''whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or inter-
fere with religious beliefs or practices or have the effect of doing 
so." •133 
The excessive entanglement prong of the establishment clause is often 
viewed as a list of prohibited entanglement that government may 
not:I34 
(1) involve itself in "continuing day-to-day relationships" with such 
pervasively religious schools; 
(2) have relationships with church-schools which involve an "element 
of governmental evaluation and standards;" 
(3) carry out legislation or regulations which create situations readily 
leading to "confrontations and conflicts" between government 
and churches; 
129. This is precisely what happened in Nebraska where a fundamentalist pastor went to jail after 
refusing to comport with state regulations governing his church school. While in jail, the 
state had shut down his school. (It should be noted that a court of final determination had 
previously upheld the constitutionality of these regulations.) See Miller, Fundamentalists 
Fight Nebraska over School, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1982, at AI; The Police Lock a Baptist 
Church, supra note 58. 
130. See Boothby, supra note 14. 
131. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) 
(citations omitted). 
132. 549 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Me. 1982). 
133. Id at 1221 (citations omitted). 
134. W. BALL, MEMORANDUM TO OUR FUNDAMENTALIST CHRISTIAN FRIENDS AND OTHER 
FRIENDS OF RELIGIONS LIBERTY, Apr. 14, 1981, at 3-4 (case citations omitted). 
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(4) have "programs whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in 
details of administration;'' 
(5) have a "sustained and detailed relationship [with church institu-
tions] for enforcement of statutory and administrative standards;" 
(6) employ, in respect to relationships between teachers and children 
in church-schools, "comprehensive methods of surveillance and 
control;" 
(7) engage in inspection of church institutional records; 
(8) carry out legislation or regulations which create situation requir-
ing "negotiations" between church institutions and government; 
(9) have relationships with church institutions which have even the 
"potential" for the foregoing entanglements. 
Some degree of government entanglement is permissible. 
Churches, for example, are presently subject to both tax and audit in 
regard to their business income. 135 Once government involvement has 
been established, the state must demonstrate that its regulatory scheme 
meets the least restrictive means-compelling interest test. 136 In 
Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 137 the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit stated that: 
in the sensitive area of First Amendment religious freedoms, the bur-
den is upon the state to show that implementation of a regulatory 
scheme will not ultimately infringe upon and entangle it in the affairs 
of a religion to an extent to which the Constitution will not 
countenance. 138 
Establishment clause concerns, however, are not triggered unless there 
is some risk that governmental regulations will impose a "superior re-
gime of official orthodoxy" 139 on a religious belief or practice. 
135. See Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 36 TAX L. 
REv. 477, 507 (1981); and Worthing, Government Surveillance of Religious Organizations, 23 
J. CHURCH & STATE 551 (1981). 
136. See Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1979) and Bangor Baptist, 
549 F. Supp. at 1222. See also Thomas, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert, 314 U.S. 398 
(1963). 
137. 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 179). 
138. ld at 75-76. 
139. Brief for Petitioners (Bob Jones University) at 31, Bob Jones University v. United States 81-
3. Violations of the excessive entanglement prong of the establishment clause can be made 
prospectively by a court. This is evidenced by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
m Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. N.L.R.B. 
The whole tenor of the Religion Clauses cases involving state aid to schools is that 
there does not have to be an actual trial run to determine whether the aid can be 
segregated, received and retained as to secular activities only, but it is sufficient to 
strike the aid down that a reasonable likelihood of possibility of entanglement exists. 
559 F.2d 1112, 1126 (7th Cir. 1977), ajf'd on statutory grounds, 440 U.S. 409 (1979). Thus 
"the danger that pervasive modem governmental power will ultimately intrude on religion 
[is in] conflict with the Religion Clauses." Week and Devins, supra note 158, at 2. As James 
Madison stated in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments: 
[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties . . . the free men of 
American did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and 
entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, 
and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle. 
Quoted in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1977). 
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THE SOLUTION 
The courts thus far have been unable to provide consistent guidance 
either to the states or to the fundamentalist schools involved in state 
regulation lawsuits. 140 In fact, many of the existing decisions are to-
tally at odds with each other. 141 And this includes decisions from the 
same state court142 and decisions involving identical regulations-all 
applying the "same" legal standards.143 Poor lawyering on the part of 
some state prosecutors144 and Christian school attornies145 offers partial 
explanation for this judicial failure. Varying regulatory schemes are 
also at issue. 146 More significant, however, these cases often present 
courts with an apparently hopeless entanglement of fact, judgment, sec-
ular values, and religious conviction. 
The primary failure of the courts has been the failure to make care-
ful factual determinations. 147 To a large extent, the outcome of cases 
involving state regulation of Christian schools often hinge on whether 
the courts prefer unrestrained parental choice in education or state con-
trol over some of the essential components of Christian education. 
Even Supreme Court guidance may not ensure uniformity since these 
140. See Devins, supra note 14; and Devins, supra note 52. 
141. See Devins, supra note 14. 
142. Compare State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181,351 N.E.2d 750 (1976) with State ex rel. Nagle 
v. Olin, 64 Ohio St.2d 341, 415 N.E.2d 279 (1980). According to William Ball: 
The Ohio Supreme Court, the Olin case has now opened the door to extensive state 
regulation of religious schools. The Court, while agreeing that the state regulations 
held unconstitutional in H'hisner were unreasonable, goes on to say, "We believe that 
such a set of less restrictive standards could, and should, be adopted." 
Memo from William Ball re: State v. Olin (Jan. 30, 1981). 
143. See infra note 209-221, and Devins, supra note 73. It should be noted that there are slight 
variances in the statutes involved in these cases. But these variances do not explain the 
tremendous variations in court decisions on this matter. 
144. See H'hisner, 47 Ohio St.2d at 217-18,351 N.E.2d at 771 ("In the face of the record before us, 
and in light of the expert testimony ... it is difficult to imagine a state interest of sufficient 
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.") and 
State v. Nobels, S 791-01 14-A (Allegan City, Mich.) slip op. at 8 ("No evidence has been 
introduced in this case that would demonstrate that the State has a compelling interest in 
applying teaching certification laws to the Nobels.") 
145. The Christian Law Association, which refuses to raise the entanglement issue, lost significant 
cases in Nebraska, North Dakota, and Massachusetts. Faith Baptist, 207 Neb. 802, 301 
N.W.2d 571; Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883; Grace Bible, supra note 73. The Christian Law Asso-
ciation's technical victory in Ohio is generally considered a setback for the fundamentalist 
cause. Olin , 64 Ohio St.2d 341,415 N.E.2d 279. The Shaver and Olin decisions both point to 
possible deficiencies in the trial record. In Shaver, the court claimed "No attempt was made 
at trial to show how compliance with the law would affect the religion of the parents or their 
children . . . A perusal of the record fails to disclose a deeply rooted religious conviction 
against the use of certified teachers" 294 N.W.2d at 894. In Olin, William Ball commented: 
"Nor does the record show that there was any development whatever for the issue of compel-
ling state interest. . . Also it does not appear that discovery was employed." Ball, supra 
note 142, at 2. 
146. See supra note 67. These variances, not surprisingly, are relied upon by courts in distinguish-
ing surfacely inconsistent judicial holdings. See Shaver, 294 N.W.2d at 898, 899 (distinguish-
in$ H'hisner and Rudasill), Faith Baptist, 207 Neb. at 814-15, 301 N.W.2d at 578-79 
(dtstinguishing H'hisner and Rudasill), Bangor Baptist, 549 F. Supp. at 1218 (distinguishing 
Faith Baptist) and Olin, 64 Ohio St.2d 353-54,415 N.E.2d at 287-288 (distinguishing Whisner 
and Shaver). 
147. This can be attributed in part to the failure of attorneys to develop factual records. See supra 
notes 144 & 145, and Weeks & Devins, supra note 103. 
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cases are easily distinguishable due to the incredible variety among 
challenged regulatory schemes.I48 Courts ultimately must apply a simi-
lar standard of review, however, to ensure consistent decisionmaking in 
this area. I49 
The current state of judicial decisionmaking in Christian school 
lawsuits is apparent in the varying judicial perceptions of teacher certi-
fication requirements. In Kentucky State Board v. Rudasill, Iso the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court, in holding such teacher certification 
requirements unconstitutional, contended that 
[i]t cannot be said as an absolute that a teacher in a nonpublic school 
. . . will be unable to instruct children to become intelligent citi-
zens. . . . [T]he receipt of 'a bachelor's degree from a standard college 
or university' is an indicator of the level of achievement, but it is not a 
sine qua non the absence of which establishes that private and paro-
chial school teachers are unable to teach their students to intelligently 
exercise the elective franchise.ISI 
The Ohio Supreme Courti52 and a Michigan trial courtis3 have simi-
larly held such certification requirements unconstitutional. 
In stark contradiction to these decisions, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court upheld a teacher certification requirement in State v. Faith Bap-
tist Church. Is4 That court thought that 
it cannot be fairly disputed that such a requirement is neither arbitrary 
not unreasonable[. A]dditionally, we believe it is also a reliable indica-
tor of the probability of success in that particular field. We believe that 
it goes without saying that the State has a compelling interest in the 
quality and ability of those who are to teach its young people. Iss 
The North Dakota Supreme Courtis6 and a North Carolina trial 
148. See supra notes 67 & 146. 
149. See Devins, supra note 14. 
150. 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979). 
151. Id at 884. 
152. In State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976), the Ohio Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional a teacher certification requirement 
In the face of the record before us, and in light of the expert testimony. [I]t is difficult 
to imagine a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming 
protection under the free exercise clause .... We will not, therefore, attempt to con-
jure up such an interest in order to sustain application of the 'minimum standards' to 
these appellants. 
ld at 217-18, 351 N.E.2d at 771. 
153. In State v. Nobel, 5-7-91-0114-A (Allegan City, Michigan), a Michigan trial court refused to 
enforce a state teacher certification requirement. 
No evidence has been introduced in this case that would demonstrate that the state 
has a compelling interest in applying the teacher certification law to the Nobels or the 
educational interest of the State would not be achieved by a requirement less restric-
tive on the religious beliefs of the Nobels. 
ld at 8. 
154. 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571 (1981). 
155. ld at 579. 
156. In State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980), the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld a 
teacher certification law claiming that 
courts are ill-equipped to act as school boards and determine the need for discrete 
aspects of a compulsory school education program. The Courtroom is simply not the 
best arena for the debate of issues of educational policy and the measurement of edu-
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court157 have used similar reasoning in upholding their respective 
teacher certification regulations. 
Commentators on this matter, not surprisingly, have assailed the 
holdings in each of these groups of cases.158 These divergent views 
cational quality. Although North Dakota's minimal requirement for state approval of 
a private or parochial school may be imperfect, without the regulations the state 
would have no reasonable assurance that its recognized interest in providing an edu-
cation for its youth is being protected. 
Id. at 899-900. 
157. In States v. Columbus Christian Academy, No. 78 CVS 1678 (Wake County Super. Ct.), a 
North Carolina trial court held that 
To insure that the child receives [essential] skills, it is necessary that he be given in-
struction on basic subjects by individuals who are qualified and competent to teach 
those subjects. The statutes and regulations which have been adopted to achieve this 
and are based upon sound educational policy and logic. 
Id. at 14. 
158. The Whisner decision was viewed with approval in Carper supra note 14 and with disap-
proval in Note, Public Regulation of Private Religious Schools, 37 OHIO ST. L. J. 899 (1976). 
The Faith Baptist case was viewed with approval in Comment, State Regulation of Religious 
Education, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 183 (1981) and with disapproval in Commentary, Douglas 
v. Faith Baptist Church Under Constitutional Scrutiny, 51 NEB. L. REv. 74 (1982). The 
Rudasill decision was viewed with disapproval in Comment, Regulation of Fundamentalist 
Christian Schools: Free Exercize of Religion vs. the State's Interest in Quality Education, 67 
KY. L. REv. 415 (1979-80) and in Education and Religion, 6 N. KY. L. REv. 125, 140-151 
(1979). 
Wendell Bird argued vigorously that courts should heed the legitimate free exercise 
claims raised by fundamentalists. In Freedom ftom Establishment and Unneutrality in Public 
School Instruction and Religious School Regulation, 1979 HARV. J. OF LAW AND PuB. PoL. 
125, 191 note 301, Mr. Bird assailed the Columbia Christian Academy rationale: 
This holding in Christian Academy was erroneous. And it was based upon the 
erroneous assumption that religious instruction does not hinder or prevent locating 
theologically acceptable instructors. The court held that "Fundamentalist Christian-
ity contains no specific prohibition against doing any of the things specifically re-
quired by the State's regulations," and in particular does not prohibit "the hiring of 
certified teachers, the presentation of instruction in certain basic subjects, the provi-
sion of textbooks or other instructional materials," or the other requirements. But the 
absence of specific injunctions in religious articles of faith does not prevent the occur-
rence of a burden on free exercise of these regulations. The court misstated the issues, 
because while religious beliefs did not prohibit the hiring of certified teachers, they 
did require the hiring of theologically acceptable teachers, which was burdened by the 
requirement of specified qualifications from accredited universities; while religious 
beliefs did not prohibit the presentation of basic instruction, they did govern many 
aspects of instruction to secondary school instruction and upper elementary instruc-
tion; and while religious convictions did not prohibit provision of textbooks, they did 
require use of texts that might not be substantially equivalent to public school texts. 
Finally, the holding was based upon the erroneous ruling that the state had a compel-
ling interest that justified these intrusive regulations, because these regulations went 
well beyond basic educational courses in which the state possibly has a compelling 
interest: · 
Countering this position, Cynthia West claimed that the Rudasill court was misguided. 
[The] trial court found that "(c]ompliance with the various regulations ... would be 
financially impossible for some of the church Plaintiffs." [T]he briefs do not support 
this finding, and there is no evidence as to whether regulations would impose such a 
burden. Furthermore, in Braunfeld v. Brown, the Supreme Court . . . stated that 
"it cannot be expected, much less required, that legislators enact no law regulating 
conduct that may in some way result in an economic disadvantage to some reli-
gious sects and not to others because of the special practices of the various reli-
gions. We do not believe that such an effect is an absolute test for determining 
whether the legislation violates the freedom of religion protected by the First 
Amendment." 
If educational studies or philosophies conflict in this critical area, and no better 
method of assuring that teachers are competent can be suggested, the logic of requir-
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among courts and commentators, more than anything else, point to the 
need for a definitive standard of review on this matter. A definitive 
standard of review could follow one of two conflicting modes of analy-
sis: judicial deference to academic judgments made by state education 
decisionmakers, 159 or a requirement that "clear and convincing proof' 
must be introduced by the state to justify an infringement on the funda-
mental religious liberty right. 160 
Clear and Convincing Proof Standard 
The current trend of conflicting court decisionmaking on this mat-
ter is not likely to change course. There is a sensible standard of re-
view, however, which should be uniformly applied: 
If there is an infringement on a sincerely held religious belief, the 
state-in order to demonstrate that this infringement is the least re-
strictive means to further some compelling state interest-must meet 
the evidentiary standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence. 
The general standard of civil litigati<;>n of preponderance of the evi-
dence is unsatisfactory in light of the preferential position of religious 
freedom and its social impact. 161 
Under this standard, freedom of religion merits the same protection as 
freedom of speech. 162 Consequently, courts could justify their willing-
ness to be less deferential in their review of state and local education 
decisionmaking-a matter that courts generally prefer to stay out 
of163-under the Supreme Court's Tinker 164 doctrine. 
In Tinker v . .Des Moines Independent Community School .Dist., 165 the 
Court upheld the First Amendment right of public school students to 
wear black arm bands to school in protest of the Vietnam War. In so 
holding, the Court required that the school must affirmatively establish 
that the wearing of these armbands would be disruptive to the educa-
ing teachers to acquire some reasonable level of higher education should override the 
speculative fears of the schools that they will be unable to fund certifiable teachers of 
their religious faith. 
Note, supra note 69, at 825 n.l36, 826. 
159. See infta notes 175 & 176. 
160. See infta notes 161 to 174. 
161. Devins, supra note 14 (adopted from Boothby, supra note 14 at 613). 
162. "The burden of proof must rest on government to justify any restraint on free expression 
prior to its judicial review and on government to demonstrate the particular facts necessary 
to sustain a limitation on suppressive behavior." L. TRIBE, supra note 116 at 7-34. The 
Supreme Court articulated the "clear and convincing" proof standard for free expression 
cases in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1956): 
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in fact finding, 
which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest in 
a transcending value . . . this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of 
placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof. . . Due 
process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne 
the burden of producing the evidence and convincing the fact-finder of his guilt. 
The application of the "clear and convincing" proof standard in individual liberty cases is 
discussed in Boothby, supra note 14 at 620-24. 
163. See infta note 176. 
164. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
165. 393 u.s. 503 (1969). 
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tional process. The Court claimed that "It can hardly be argued that 
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the school house gate."166 Similarly, in funda-
mentalist Christian lawsuits, the state ought to demonstrate that stu-
dents in fundamentalist schools are not learning as much as their 
public school counterparts. 167 
Religious freedom is a preferred constitutional protection against 
which "only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise 
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of reli-
gion."168 Consequently, it is generally recognized that 
[i]t is not enough . . . for a state to show that its interest in an educated 
citizenry override religious group's general opposition to state regula-
tory authority over sectarian schools. The state must also justify its 
interest in each specific regulation or standard imposed under this au-
thority that infringes upon free exercise. 169 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the need for narrowly 
drawn legislation when religious liberty interests are at stake170 and the 
central role of religious liberty in a democratic state, 171 it "has never 
specified the particular standard of proof constitutionally required 
before the state can deprive an individual of [religious liberty] 
interests."172 
Professor Gianelli has argued that "[a] thoroughgoing balancing 
test would measure three elements of the competing government inter-
est: first, the importance of the secular value underlying the govern-
ment regulation; second, the degree of proximity and necessarily that 
the chosen regulatory means bears to the underlying value; and third, 
the impact that an exemption for religious reasons would have on the 
overall regulatory program."173 Yet even ·this precise standard of re-
view is without meaning, unless the courts require the state to present 
"clear and convincing" proof as to the centrality and relative unobtru-
siveness of the existing regulatory scheme.174 Such a requirement 
would be in accord with the current standard of review in equal protec-
tion and free speech lawsuits. 
166. /d at 506. 
167. See Murreen supra note 17 at 8. 
168. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
169. Note, supra note 69, at 813. 
170. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (''the power to regulate [religious 
conduct] must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the 
protected freedoms.") 
171. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan J., concurring) ("[religious 
freedom] contribute to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a 
vigorous, pluralistic society"). 
172. Boothby, supra note 14 at 618. 
173. Gianelli, Religious Liberty. Establishment, and .Doctrinal .Development: Part I. The Religious 
Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1390 (1967). A discussion of both the constitu-
tional standard applied in free exercise cases and the adequacy of that standard can be found 
supra notes 170-172. 
174. See supra note 104; and Clark, supra note 116. 
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Inapplicability of Judicial Abstention Doctrine 
. 
Courts generally are reluctant to intervene in matters of education 
policy on the basis of deference to the expertise of education deci-
sionmakers and deference to the political process, which supposedly 
serve as adequate independent checks on state and local education offi-
cials.175 Neither academic decisionmaking nor local control, however, 
serve as adequate protection against abuses of religious liberty 
guarantees. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that "by and large, 'public edu-
cation in our nation is committed to the control of state and local au-
thorities,' and the federal courts should not ordinarily 'intervene in the 
resolution of conflict which arise in the daily operation of school sys-
tems.' " 176 Recently, Chief Justice Burger again espoused the virtues of 
local control of public education in Island Trees Union School .District 
v. Pico. 111 
This theory of local control, however, is inapplicable to Christian 
day schools. 
First, the logic of local control hinges on the assumption that indi-
vidual choice will be fairly expressed through the political process. Yet 
the raison d'etre for Christian day schools is a dissatisfaction on the 
part of the fundamentalists with the current structure of public educa-
tion. Hence, it would be absurd for a court to say that these minority 
viewpoints must seek protection in the political process. 
Second, the local control rationale ignores the transcendent consti-
tutional rights at stake. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 178 for example, the 
Court noted that it is the duty of federal courts "to apply the First 
Amendment's mandate in our educational system where essential to 
175. Note, Due Process_ I>ue Politics, and Due Respect: Three Models of Legitimate School Govern-
ance, 94 HARV. L. REV., 1106 (1981). 
176. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 
177. 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982). The Chief Justice stated in dissent in Pico: 
Through participation in the election of school board members, the parents influence, 
if not control, the direction of their children's education. A school board is not a giant 
bureaucracy far removed from accountability for its actions; it is truly 'of the people 
and by the people.' A school board reflects its constitutency in a very real sense and 
thus could not long exercise unchecked discretion in its choice to acquire or remove 
books. If the parents disagree with the educational decisions of the school board, they 
can take steps to remove the board members from office. 
ld at 2820-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In a similar vein, Justice Powell contended inPico 
that "[i]t is fair to say that no single agency of government at any level is closer to the people 
whom it serves than the typical school board." /d at 2822 (Powell. J., dissenting). 
This notion that the constitutional rights of students and their families are adequately 
protected through the political process was adopted by a majority of the Court in Ingraham 
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). In Ingraham, the Court upheld the constitutionality of cor-
poral punishment over due process and cruel and unusual punishment claims. For the 
Court: 
The openness of the public school and its supervision by the community afforded 
significant safeguards against [abuse] .... As long as the schools are open to public 
scrutiny, there is no reason to believe that the common-law constraints [of tort law] 
will not effectively remedy and deter excesses. 
Id at 670. See Note, Sllpra note 175, at 1112-16. 
178. 393 u.s. 624 (1968). 
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safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of speech and of in-
quiry."179 The Court similarly held in West Virginia v. Barnette 180 the 
Boards of Education have no functions "that they may not perform 
within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the 
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitu-
tional freedoms of the individual."181 If religious liberty is thus viewed 
as being central to the constitutional scheme, judicial deference to state 
education policies should not be based on the political process. 
Courts, for the most part, also are unwilling to intervene in educa-
tion policy determinations.182 The rationale behind this standard of 
review was stated in Tedeschi v. Wagner College: 183 
[M]atters involving academic standards generally rest upon the 
subjective judgment of professional educators, (thus) courts are reluc-
tant to impose the strictures of traditional legal rules. Though such 
matters are subject to judicial scrutiny, the issue reviewed in such a 
case is whether the institution has acted in good faith. 184 
The Supreme Court has also expressed support for the judgments of 
professionals.185 In Youngberg v. Romeo, 186 Justice Powell accorded a 
"presumptive correctness" to the decisions of professional personnel by 
virtue of their "demonstrated" competence through education, training, 
or experience. 187 In Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. 
Horowit.z 188 the Court went so far as to hold that the constitutional 
procedural due process protections were afforded to a student dis-
missed on academic grounds simply because the dismissal was made by 
professional educators. 189 
Regardless of whether deference to academic expertise is sound ju-
dicial policy, 190 such deference is constitutionally impermissible if fun-
damental right exercises are at stake. As stated in Barnette, 
179. Id at 104. 
180. 319 u.s. 614 (1943). 
181. Id at 637. 
182. See Devins, Plagiarism at Princeton: An Academic Judgment or a Disciplinary Procedure, LEX 
COLLEGII, Winter, 1983. 
183. 49 N.Y.2d 652, 404 N.E.2d 1302 (1980). 
184. Id at 658, 404 N.E.2d at 1304. 
185. See Rosenblum, High Courts Support for Professionalism in Education, Eouc. WEEK, Oct. 6, 
192, at 24. 
186. 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982). 
187. /d at 2461-62. 
188. 435 u.s. 78 (1978). 
189. See Note, supra note 175, at 1116-19. In Horowitz, the Court concluded that "the determina-
tion whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cu-
mulative information and is not readily adapted to the tools of indirect administrative 
decisonmaking." 435 U.S. at 90. 
190. Judge Bazelon observed that: 
diffidence in the face of (academic] expertise is conduct unbecoming a court. Very 
few judges are (educational experts]. But equally few are economists, aeronautic engi-
neers, atomic scientists, or marine biologists. For some reason, however, many people 
seem to accept judicial scrutiny of, say, the effect of a proposed dam on fish life, while 
they reject similar scrutiny of [academic matters]. 
Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 743-44 (1969). [as 
adapted in Dessem,Academic Versus Judicial Expertise, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 476-481 (1978). 
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The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicisitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal princi-
ples to be applied by the Courts. 191 
Thus judicial deference to academic decisionmaking or local con-
trol is inappropriate when fundamental rights are at stake.192 Quite 
simply, "First Amendment rights are entitled to special constitutional 
solicitude."193 This "special constitutional solicitude" should be re-
flected through a requirement that the state produce "clear and con-
vincing proof' that any state-imposed infringement on religious liberty 
satisfy the least restrictive means-compelling interest requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
The conflict between Christian educators and the state is not likely 
to end.194 Yet, the courts can assist in the resolution of this conflict by 
adopting a standard of review that will lead to predictable results in 
this type of case. The contention made in this article is that courts 
should require the state to introduce "clear and convincing proof' that 
its regulatory scheme is the least restrictive means available to effectu-
ate some compelling state interest. 19s The importance of religious free-
dom in American life justifies the adoption of this standard. Finally, 
judicial deference to either academic decisionmaking or the political 
process are inadequate checks against state imposed interferences with 
religious liberty freedoms. 196 
191. 319 U.S. at 639. 
192. See supra notes 244 to 247 and accompanying text. 
193. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
194. See supra notes 8-10 and Devins. supra note 4. 
195. See supra notes 161-74 and accompanying text. 
196. See supra notes 175-91 and accompanying text. 
